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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper, Lavoie and Sheldon (2000) advance the hypothesis that the empirically 
observed US comparative advantage in biotechnology can be explained by sources of 
heterogeneity within the biotechnology R&D investment process.  Using a real options approach, 
they illustrate how international differences in the per-period rate of investment and the level of 
domestic regulatory uncertainty could be sufficient to explain the emergence of US 
biotechnology firms as the world leaders in the industry, as measured by industry aggregates. 
Specialization in high technology carries the implication that domestic firms will enjoy 
Schumpeterian excess returns. However, the accumulation of rents stemming from innovative 
activity could be diminished by the growing presence of foreign-based multinationals in the 
domestic industry. In particular, foreign multinationals can enter into alliances with or even 
acquire established domestic start-ups, and in doing so, obtain access to proprietary knowledge 
stocks generated from ongoing domestic R&D. This in turn implies that the current and future 
rents embodied in these knowledge stocks will be partially or fully appropriated by overseas 
entities. 
Recent dynamics in the biotechnology industry suggest that this process may be 
underway. Sharp (1996) observes that, 
"… European multinationals are penetrating and exploiting American capabilities in 
biotechnology … The large European-based multinationals in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, in 
pursuit of the necessary knowledge and skills in biotechnology, have through arrangements of 
one sort or another widely penetrated the American knowledge base." 
Recent examples of this process include a $45 million deal between German-based 
Hoechst Schering AgrEvo and US-based Gene Logic to discover genes useful for crop protection  2
and improvement products, an agreement between Hoffman-LaRoche and California-based 
Agouron to develop anti-cancer drugs, the establishment of a 5-year R&D collaboration between 
BASF AG and Massachusetts-based Mitotix, and even the $25 million research alliance between 
the plant biology department at the University of California at Berkeley and Swiss-based 
Novartis.  
In this paper, the implications of foreign-based multinational activity for the current US 
comparative advantage in biotechnology are considered. In particular, a two-tiered industry 
structure for biotechnology is posited: start-ups, who pioneered the industry, and multinationals, 
who are relatively late entrants. Sources of heterogeneity within the biotechnology R&D process 
led to the emergence of US start-ups as the world leaders in biotechnology vis-à-vis their 
European rivals. Although many of these start-ups are yet to be profitable, they have 
accumulated valuable assets in the form of proprietary knowledge stocks originating from 
ongoing R&D projects. By either forming alliances with or even acquiring American start-ups, 
European multinationals gain access to the knowledge stocks arising from US R&D, and in 
doing so, establish a claim on the excess returns these stocks may produce in the future through 
successful commercialization.  
In section 2, a characterization of industry dynamics in a biotechnology industry 
populated by start-ups and multinationals is developed. This allows an examination of how late 
entry by European multinationals could result in a re-allocation of ownership rights to the 
potential excess returns from innovation embodied in proprietary US knowledge stocks. In 
section 3, some of the implications of this characterization are illustrated using computer 
simulation, based on a refinement to Lavoie and Sheldon’s (op.cit.) real options model of 
biotechnology R&D investment.  Essentially, the model is extended to include the possibility  3
that multinational firms may acquire R&D undertaken by domestic start-ups. Finally in section 4, 
the policy and trade implications stemming from foreign European penetration of the US 
biotechnology industry are discussed.  
 
2.  A Characterization of Industry Dynamics in Biotechnology 
  The essential premise of Lavoie and Sheldon (ibid.) is that traditional explanations for the 
pattern of specialization in high technology industries are poor indicators a priori of the eventual 
emergence of US firms as world leaders in biotechnology vis-à-vis European firms. This point 
can be illustrated by considering the Grossman and Helpman (1991) endogenous innovation 
model of dynamic comparative advantage. 
  In this particular model, comparative advantage in high technology industries emanates 
from one of two sources: relative factor endowments or initial conditions in the form of inherited 
knowledge stocks. These elements impact the innovation process by creating asymmetries in the 
cost of R&D. If knowledge spillovers are international in scope, Grossman and Helpman predict 
that relative factor endowments will determine the pattern of specialization. Alternatively, if 
relative factor endowments are similar across countries, the pattern of trade can still be fixed if 
knowledge spillovers are restricted to be national in scope. In this interpretation, one country 
begins with favorable initial conditions in the form of relatively more “inherited blueprints” than 
its trading partner. This country will then enjoy a “head start” in innovation, and since 
knowledge spillovers are national in scope, it will perpetuate its lead through declining R&D 
costs.  
Neither of these sources of heterogeneity, factor endowments or initial knowledge stocks, 
seem especially appealing as explanations for the US comparative advantage in biotechnology.  4
The convergence of the industrialized countries since 1945 in terms of traditional sources of 
comparative advantage such as factor endowments has been well documented. Furthermore, 
initial knowledge stocks likely took the form of basic scientific research preceding the 
commercialization of biotechnology, much of which occurred outside the US. While proprietary 
knowledge originating from the process of commercialization may be restricted on a national 
basis, basic scientific research, which likely constitutes initial knowledge stocks, was readily 
available internationally. 
  As an alternative approach, Lavoie and Sheldon developed a real options approach to 
explain the US comparative advantage in biotechnology. They formulate a firm’s decision to 
invest in biotechnology R&D as analogous to holding a financial option - i.e., the right, but not 
the obligation, to invest in an R&D program. Comparative advantage then evolves into a 
question of option management: i.e., what incentives caused US biotechnology firms to exercise 
their options to invest earlier than their European rivals? Lavoie and Sheldon find that the 
presence of international differences in the form of a higher US per-period rate of investment and 
a less uncertain US regulatory environment yields the result that US biotechnology firms, on 
average, initiate more R&D projects, begin investment sooner, innovate more rapidly, persevere 
longer in the face of mounting R&D costs, and successfully complete more projects than their 
European rivals. 
  Typically, it is assumed that a country specializing in a high technology sector will enjoy 
the super-normal rents associated with innovation. Indeed, public policy has often stressed the 
need to promote high technology industries, as opposed to mature, "commodity" industries with 
little or no excess returns, for this very reason (Krugman, 1984). However, the recent history of 
the biotechnology industry suggests that this assumption may be too simplistic.  5
As noted earlier, the biotechnology industry is currently undergoing a period of 
consolidation, in which multinational corporations have acquired or formed alliances with many 
of the smaller start-up companies who pioneered the industry. It is significant to note that many 
of these alliances and acquisitions have been transatlantic in nature - in particular, European 
multinationals operating in the US biotechnology industry.  
  Given these conditions, it can be hypothesized that the penetration of the US 
biotechnology industry by foreign multinationals serves to dilute the concentration of current or 
future rents associated with biotechnological innovation in the United States. In other words, the 
Schumpeterian returns to innovation expected to accrue to domestic firms specializing in high 
technology industries like biotechnology may be dissipated by the increased presence of foreign-
based multinationals in the domestic market. We elaborate on this theme with the following 
characterization of the dynamics of the biotechnology industry.  
  There are two distinct classes of firms present in the biotechnology industry: start-ups 
and multinationals. Start-ups are relatively small, un-diversified firms who were essentially built 
"from the ground up" for the sole purpose of exploiting opportunities in the commercialization of 
biotechnology. Typically, their capital is obtained from external sources. Start-ups are often the 
result of a union between bench scientists and venture capitalists; the latter provide the seed 
capital to form the company and begin operations. After a time, it is not uncommon for the start-
up to be taken public through an initial public offering, which provides a further infusion of 
capital for the start-up’s research efforts.  
Multinationals, on the other hand, are relatively large, diversified firms with access to 
internally generated capital and operations in more than one country. In general, start-ups were 
the earliest entrants to the biotechnology industry, followed by entry of the multinationals, who  6
are currently initiating consolidation in the industry through the acquisition of and alliances with 
established start-ups and other multinationals. 
  The early entry of the start-ups into biotechnology may be explained as a result of 
competition for external capital combined with the start-ups’ greater flexibility to undertake the 
R&D projects that pioneered the biotechnology industry. As Lavoie and Sheldon note, however, 
conditions in the US, greater access to capital and less regulatory uncertainty, fostered more 
rapid growth in start-ups there than in Europe. In other words, US biotechnology firms innovated 
more rapidly and on a larger scale than firms in other countries.  
  Multinationals, on the other hand, were, in general, late entrants to the biotechnology 
industry relative to start-ups. Sharp (op.cit.) notes that, 
 "[a] combination of uncertainty, skepticism, and inexperience led to what may be called 
a ’a minimalist strategy’ on the part of most large firms. While avoiding large investments most 
of the companies built up teams of researchers large enough to keep abreast of the science and to 
monitor developments and competitors … One consequence of this strategy of 'watching and 
waiting' was that it conceded leadership in development of the new technology to the small 
companies which were so closely linked to the academic base".   
  It was noted earlier that in general, the start-ups that pioneered the biotechnology industry 
started with the same baseline "knowledge stock", scientific information published in the 
literature. However, as R&D programs commence, and the projects are gradually completed, 
research results and experiences accumulate. These results and experiences are closely guarded 
proprietary assets of the firms that produce them. Thus, the conduct of R&D is synonymous with 
the creation of the type of proprietary knowledge stocks to which Grossman and Helpman (ibid.) 
refer in their model of endogenous innovation. The value of a firm, especially in a relatively  7
young industry such as biotechnology, is often heavily based on the creation of these proprietary 
knowledge stocks, in that they serve as an indicator of the firm’s future ability to successfully 
commercialize valuable biotechnology products. 
  Therefore, in the biotechnology industry’s nascent stages, the industry is populated 
mainly by US-based start-ups, conducting ongoing R&D, and transforming the initial knowledge 
stocks, which were available equally to all firms regardless of national origin, into proprietary 
knowledge stocks representing closely guarded assets of the firm. Conditions in the 
biotechnology R&D process lead to a US comparative advantage in biotechnology, which is then 
reinforced and perpetuated by the development of proprietary knowledge stocks on the part of 
US start-ups, a result reminiscent of the Grossman and Helpman framework.    
  At this point, the following question must be posed: what precipitated the entry of 
multinationals into the biotechnology industry? Sharp notes that, 
"by the mid-1980s, the period of watching and waiting was over. Most of these large 
companies recognized that, whatever their original reservations, biotechnology had established 
itself as an important enabling technology, i.e., a route to new product development, and would 
be essential for future product innovation." 
An heuristic formulation of the multinationals’ entry decision can be developed using a 
real options framework similar to that employed by Lavoie and Sheldon in detailing the start-ups’ 
investment decision.  In the early stages of the biotechnology industry, multinationals, in 
addition to the start-ups, acquire an option to invest in biotechnology R&D. However, the 
multinationals use different criteria to mange the option than the start-ups. In particular, it can be 
hypothesized that start-ups invest first relative to the multinationals, possibly as a result of 
competition for external investment capital. At this stage of industry development, comparative  8
advantage in biotechnology is determined by factors within the biotechnology R&D investment 
process. The sources of comparative advantage relevant at this formative stage of the 
biotechnology industry favor the US, resulting in an industry dominated by US start-ups. 
  Rather than exercising their options to invest immediately, the multinationals choose to 
wait and observe conditions in the investment environment. In particular, they monitor the 
performance of the start-ups. Most of the start-ups cannot be considered profitable, so it is 
unlikely that the multinationals use profitability as the performance metric, rather, they monitor 
developments in the start-ups’ ongoing R&D - in other words, the accumulation of proprietary 
knowledge stocks. Once these stocks reach a critical level, the multinationals exercise their 
option to invest, possibly by direct in-house investment, but also through alliances with or 
acquisition of established start-ups.  
Multinationals entering the industry must select the start-ups they choose to form 
alliances with or acquire. It seems likely that this selection will be based on the pattern of 
specialization established in the industry through the R&D activity of the start-ups. In particular, 
it is surmised that multinationals will be more likely to invest in start-ups located in the country 
holding the comparative advantage in biotechnology R&D and production, which as Lavoie and 
Sheldon observe, appears to be the United States. Two explanations can be used to justify this 
behavior. First, since the US has established a comparative advantage, investment conditions 
must be more favorable in that country than elsewhere. Second, the fact that US firms are the 
world leaders in the industry suggest that the knowledge stocks they have accumulated exceed, 
on average, those of their European counterparts. Therefore, it may be expected that 
multinational penetration of the American biotechnology industry will be greater than that 
observed in the European industry.  9
This in turn implies that European multinationals will have a greater propensity to 
acquire US start-ups than European ones, resulting in a cross-country pattern of ownership of the 
assets of the US start-ups in the form of European claims on the proprietary knowledge stocks of 
US-based start-ups. This has the ancillary effect of re-allocating the current and future rents 
embodied in these knowledge stocks from their originators - the US start-ups - to the European 
multinationals. Thus, an asymmetry emerges in the long-run structure of the industry, in that 
biotechnology R&D and production is concentrated in the United States, based on the 
comparative advantage established early in the time-line of the industry by the US start-ups, but 
the long-run allocation of the excess returns arising from this specialization is more evenly 
distributed across US and European enterprises.    
 
3. Analysis 
In this section, an illustration is offered of how the acquisition and alliance activity of 
foreign-based multinationals can reduce the concentration of excess returns accruing to start-up 
firms in the country specializing in biotechnology.  The implications of the hypothesized 
industry dynamics discussed above are examined using a refinement of the simulation techniques 
employed in Lavoie and Sheldon. 
Lavoie and Sheldon suggest that the issue of comparative advantage in biotechnology can 
be usefully examined in the context of a real options framework. Real options investment models 
rely on three characteristics of investment: irreversibility, ongoing uncertainty, and a firm’s 
discretion to control the timing of its investment. Given these characteristics, the opportunity to 
invest is analogous to holding a financial option, with the exception that the option is “written” 
on a real asset, rather than a financial security. The option confers the right, but not the  10
obligation, to initiate investment. By investing, the firm irrevocably “kills” the option to delay; 
therefore, the value of this lost flexibility is part of the investment cost. Techniques for pricing 
financial options can be used to determine a firm’s optimal investment strategy. The decision 
rules for managing the option are influenced by factors such as the necessity to invest 
incrementally, the presence of time to build, the degree and type of uncertainty, and the rate of 
productive investment. These factors coincide with a stylized view of the structure of R&D 
investment in the biotechnology industry. 
In Lavoie and Sheldon’s formulation, a biotechnology firm acquires an opportunity, or 
option, to invest in an R&D program. The firm can either invest immediately, if current 
conditions warrant, or hold the option while observing the evolution of investment conditions 
over time. The option can be exercised at a later date if conditions change such that investing 
becomes economically desirable. Once the firm exercises its option, it invests incrementally over 
multiple time periods. At the same time, the stochastic investment conditions continue to 
fluctuate, driven by two sources of uncertainty: 1) technical factors, corresponding to the 
physical difficulty of completing the investment, and 2) external factors, such as uncertainty over 
the domestic biotechnology regulatory regime, or the results of basic research conducted by the 
scientific community. These sources of uncertainty may combine to make the R&D proceed 
faster or slower than anticipated. If the R&D expenditures accumulate to the point that the 
investment no longer appears profitable, the firm can terminate the R&D midstream. 
Alternatively, the investment might terminate immediately, rather than through a gradual 
process, if for example scientific research indicates that the R&D is based on erroneous 
assumptions. This abrupt cessation of the R&D is called a termination event.  11
Given this scenario, the firm’s investment strategy can be summarized by an indicator 
known as the expected cost to completion, K. At each stage of the investment, the firm completes 
part of the R&D, and also obtains new information associated with the uncertain elements of the 
investment environment. Based on these factors, the firm re-evaluates its expectation of how 
much it will cost to complete the project from that time forward. A critical level of cost to 
completion, K*, exists, such that, if the expected cost to completion exceeds this level, it is not 
optimal for the firm to exercise its option to invest, or to continue the R&D if it has already been 
initiated. Conversely, if expected cost to completion is below the critical level, the firm should 
go ahead and initiate investment if it has not done so already, or carry on with the next stage of 
the investment.    
To model these conditions, Lavoie and Sheldon extend Pindyck’s (1993) real options 
model of uncertain investment cost. A biotechnology firm acquires an opportunity to invest in a 
new R&D project. When completed, the project yields a product or process innovation worth V 
with certainty. However, the cost to complete the project is uncertain. The firm holds an option 
to invest in this project which it has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise. The expected 
cost to completion, K, evolves according to: 
dK = -Idt + β (IK)
1/2dW + γ KdZ.     (1) 
I is the per-period rate of investment, β  and γ  are scalars representing the level of technical 
uncertainty and regulatory uncertainty, respectively, and dW and dZ are increments of standard 
Wiener processes, with mean zero and variance dt. Equation (1) represents the law of motion for 
expected cost to completion, driven by the investment activity of the firm (the first term), the 
evolution of technical uncertainty (the second term), and the evolution of regulatory uncertainty 
(the third term).  12
  The value of the investment opportunity, F(K,q), is impacted by the possibility of a 
random Poisson termination event, q, which takes the form: 
ξ dq,          ( 2 )  
where, ξ  = -F, and dq = 1 with probability λ dt, and 0 with probability (1 – λ dt). λ  is the constant 
mean arrival rate of a termination event. Recall that a termination event may be attributed to the 
results of basic research conducted in an external scientific community which reveals that the 
scientific principles upon which the research is based are in error. According to Equation (2), 
occurrence of the event implies that the value of the project instantaneously falls to zero, and the 
project is therefore immediately abandoned. 
To determine its optimal investment strategy, the firm solves the following infinite 
horizon optimal stopping problem using dynamic programming: 
F(K,q) = max E0[Ve




-µ tdt].      (3) 
where time to build, T,  is stochastic. Asset valuation in a risk-neutral economy is subject to the 
following relation: 
rF = -I + E[dF/dt].       (4) 
Equation (4) states that the risk-free return from holding the asset must equal the expected net 
cash flow plus the expected capital gain. Applying Ito’s Lemma yields: 
E[dF/dt] = -IFK + 1/2β
2IKFKK + 1/2γ  
2K
2FKK - λ F.    (5) 
Therefore: 
(r+λ )F = -I -IFK + 1/2γ
2K
2FKK + 1/2β
2IKFKK  ,    (6) 
which is subject to the boundary conditions: 
  13
F(0) = V 
lim (K→∞ ) F(K) = 0 
1/2β
2K*FKK(K*) – FK(K*) – 1 = 0 
Value matching condition: F(K) continuous at K*.  
Equation (6) is then solved numerically for K*, which is the critical cost to completion. 
The mathematics presented above can be summarized as follows. In the extended 
Pindyck model, the biotechnology firm acquires an option to invest in an R&D project of certain 
value V. Investment is constrained to proceed at the maximum per-period rate I. Expected cost to 
completion K evolves stochastically according to the uncertainty in the investment environment. 
Technical uncertainty and regulatory uncertainty are represented respectively by the parameters 
β  and γ , which are scalars for uncorrelated standard Weiner processes. Uncertainty in the 
scientific environment is represented by a Poisson process, the mean arrival rate being λ . The 
risk-free rate of interest is given by the parameter r. Given values for the parameters V, I, r, λ , β , 
γ , the model can be solved numerically for the firm’s critical cost to completion K*: the 
maximum level of cost to completion for which it is economically feasible to either initiate the 
investment or continue an ongoing R&D project. If the initial expected cost to completion K 
exceeds K*, the firm will delay investment. If the investment has already been initiated when the 
evolution of K exceeds K*, the firm abandons the project midstream. 
Dynamic stochastic simulation is employed to consider the implications of the investment 
model discussed above. An iteration of the simulation begins with random draws to obtain an 
initial expected cost to completion K, and a waiting time for the first occurrence of a Poisson 
termination event. At time t = 0, the firm determines if the initial K exceeds K*: if so, the firm 
delays investment to observe the stochastic evolution of K, driven by the random component  14
associated with regulatory uncertainty. If the current value of K eventually falls below K*, the 
firm exercises its option to invest at that time. Otherwise, the firm observes K until the 
termination event occurs, rendering the investment option worthless. 
If the option is exercised, investment proceeds as follows. For each time period, the 
expected cost to completion is incremented by subtracting the firm’s current resource allocation 
to the investment, and adding on the (positive or negative) random components embodied in the 
technical and regulatory uncertainty. The firm compares the current K to K*; if K exceeds K*, 
the project is abandoned midstream; else, incremental investment continues until expected cost 
to completion equals zero, at which point the R&D project is considered successfully completed. 
If at any time the current period coincides with the random time corresponding to the occurrence 
of the termination event, the project is terminated immediately. 
  Heterogeneity is introduced into the simulation by designating different values for I and γ  
for representative US and European firms. Simulation results suggest that based on this 
heterogeneity, the representative US firm on average initiates more R&D projects, commences 
investment sooner, innovates more rapidly, perseveres longer in the face of mounting R&D 
costs, and ultimately, successfully completes more projects than the representative European 
firm. This suggests that US biotechnology firms will eventually emerge as the world leaders in 
the industry, and by extension, acquire the assets and excess returns associated with innovation 
in high technology industries.  
This simulation is used as the basis for the analysis in the present paper. First, an industry 
populated solely by American and European start-ups is considered. Estimates place the number 
of start-ups in the US in 1996 at 1,287, compared to 716 European firms: these estimates are 
utilized in the simulation. At time t = 0, each biotechnology firm acquires an option to invest in a  15
real asset, in other words, the right, but not the obligation, to initiate an irreversible investment in 
an uncertain R&D project. The model is parameterized using the combination of 1996 industry 
aggregates and ad hoc values employed by Lavoie and Sheldon. In particular, the value of R&D, 
the risk-free rate of interest, λ , and β  are assumed to be the same for both types of firms, and are 
parameterized as $262 million, 0.055, 0.067, and 0.5, respectively. Heterogeneity takes the form 
of the maximum per-period rate of investment, set to $16 million per year for the US firm, and 
$6 million per year for the European firm, and the level of regulatory uncertainty, γ , set to 0.1 for 
the US firm, and 0.2 for the European firm. 
  Using the parameterization detailed above, 1,287 iterations were run representing the 
number of US biotechnology start-ups in 1996; in addition, 716 iterations were conducted to 
represent the number of European start-ups that same year. Given these 2,003 total iterations, 
Table 1 below reports the share of successfully completed R&D projects owned by US and 
European start-ups. 
Table 1: Share of Successfully Completed R&D Projects (% owned)   
US Start-ups   91    
European Start-ups    9                                                              
  In an industry populated solely by start-ups, the sources of heterogeneity, embodied in 
the per-period rate of investment and the level of regulatory uncertainty, result in the majority of 
successful R&D projects belonging to US firms. This corroborates the previous results reported 
by Lavoie and Sheldon. By extension, and absent the presence of multinationals, it is also the 
case that the excess returns from innovation embodied in these projects are also concentrated in 
the United States.  16
Multinationals are introduced into the analysis in the form of a random process 
representing multinational penetration of the biotechnology industry. This process is intended to 
be suggestive of the option management problem underlying the multinationals’ entry decision; 
however, at this stage the specifics of the problem are not modeled.  Instead, a function f(t) is 
defined to be the probability at time t that a start-up’s R&D will be acquired by a multinational, 
where f(t) = 1/[(γ F/γ D)ρ t+1], defined on the interval (0,1]. In this equation, γ F and γ D are the 
levels of regulatory uncertainty in the foreign and domestic biotechnology industries, and ρ  is a 
constant scalar set to 0.001. The function f(t) equals one at time t = 0, and converges to zero in 
the limit as t goes to infinity. This function is used to characterize the probability that a 
multinational acquires the R&D of a start-up. At the commencement of each iteration, a random 
draw u is made from the uniform distribution, on the range [0,1]. For each time period t, u is 
compared to the contemporaneous level of f(t). If  u > f(t), then the R&D is acquired by a 
multinational; else, the start-up continues to retain ownership. Note that the probability of a 
multinational acquiring the R&D increases with t, corresponding to the idea that the value of 
ongoing R&D increases over time, as proprietary knowledge stocks develop and mature.  
The ratio (γ F/γ D) is positively correlated with f(t). In other words, an increase in the level 
of regulatory uncertainty in the foreign industry, or a decrease in the level of uncertainty in the 
domestic industry, increases the probability that a domestic start-up’s R&D will be acquired by a 
multinational. This is because, ceteris paribus, a multinational would prefer to minimize the risk 
associated with its investment by operating in a relatively certain regulatory environment.  
If the random process determines that a start-up’s R&D is acquired by a multinational, a 
second random draw, uu, from the uniform distribution determines the geographical origins of 
the purchaser. For simplicity, it is assumed that US and European multinationals are equally  17
likely to purchase ongoing start-up R&D. Therefore, if uu > 0.5, the multinational is considered 
US-based; else, the multinational is considered European-based. 
It is assumed that multinationals do not perform R&D internally, and that the potential 
for multinational acquisition does not enter the start-up investment decision process. Given this 
characterization of the activity of multinationals, the simulations for US and European 
biotechnology firms are re-run, with the added refinement of the possibility of multinational 
acquisition. The following results are obtained. 
Table 2: Share of Successfully Completed R&D Projects (% owned)   
 
US   European 
Start-ups   51         9      
 
Multinationals  21       19       
 
 
The introduction of multinationals into the industry has the effect of transferring control 
of a portion of the successful R&D projects to multinationals: approximately 60 percent of the 
projects are owned by the start-ups who originated them, while the remaining 40 percent have 
been acquired by multinationals. The penetration of multinationals into the market is not 
symmetric across countries, however. In Table 3, the level of multinational penetration in the US 
and European industries is reported. 
Table 3: Level of Multinational Penetration (%)   
US Industry:     42 
European Industry:    26      
Penetration of the US biotechnology industry by multinationals is greater than that of the 
European industry, brought about by the higher level of regulatory uncertainty associated with 
the latter; in other words, multinationals are more likely to acquire the R&D of US-based start- 18
ups than their European counterparts. This result can be sharpened by examining cross-country 
ownership of biotechnology assets, reported in Table 4 .  
Table 4: Cross-Country Multinational Penetration (%)              
 
R&D Originated by US Start-up, Owned by European Multinational:   19  
 
R&D Originated by European Start-up, Owned by US Multinational:   10   
 
These results suggest that the concentration in the United States of assets and returns 
generated from the successful R&D projects has been diluted compared to the case of a start-ups-
only industry, as control of R&D shifts from US start-ups to European-based multinationals. 
Thus the result is obtained that, despite the US comparative advantage in biotechnology, 
embodied in international differences in the per-period rate of investment and the level of 
regulatory uncertainty, and exploited by the US start-ups to emerge as world leaders in the 
industry, European entities control a substantial portion of the market. Specifically, US firms, 
start-ups and multinationals, control 72 percent of the R&D, while European firms control the 
remaining 38 percent. This can be compared to the benchmark start-ups only case, where US 
firms controlled over 90 percent of the R&D. Ironically, this re-allocation of returns is the result 
of one of the very sources of heterogeneity which established the US comparative advantage in 
the first place, the lower level of regulatory uncertainty. 
  To sharpen understanding of the effect of regulatory uncertainty on multinationals’ 
decisions to acquire ongoing start-up research, a comparative statics analysis is undertaken in the 
form of increasing the level of European regulatory uncertainty to 0.5. Re-running the 
simulations with this change in place yields the following results. 
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Table 5:  Share of Successfully Completed R&D Projects (% owned)   
US   European 
Start-ups   34   15      
 
Multinationals  24   27       
The increase in European regulatory uncertainty has the effect of reducing still further the 
share of the industry controlled by US start-ups (from 51 to 34 percent), and simultaneously 
increasing the share held by multinationals. Multinational penetration of the US and European 
industries is reported in Table 6. 
Table 6: Level of Multinational Penetration (%)     
US Industry:     60 
European Industry:      7      
The increase in the level of regulatory uncertainty in the European industry has the effect 
of increasing the presence of multinationals in the US market from 42 to 60 percent, while, at the 
same time, reducing penetration of the European market from 26 to 7 percent. This point is 
corroborated through an examination of the cross-country ownership of biotechnology R&D. 
Table 7: Cross-Country Multinational Penetration (% owned)         
 
R&D Originated by US Start-up, Owned by European Multinational:   32  
 
R&D Originated by European Start-up, Owned by US Multinational:     5   
The presence of European-based multinationals grows from 19 to 32 percent, indicating a 
significant transfer of assets and returns from US entities to European ones. Specifically, US 
firms now control only 58 percent of the global industry, while the European share has climbed 
to 42 percent. As regulatory uncertainty increases in Europe relative to the US, start-ups in the 
US become correspondingly more attractive relative to European start-ups as acquisition targets 
for multinationals. This result has important implications in the context of events currently  20
witnessed in the biotechnology industry. As the European Union continues to tighten its 
regulatory regime governing biotechnology, this translates into a higher value of γ  for the 
European industry. As the results above suggest, a higher European γ  has the dual effect of 
increasing both multinational penetration of the US industry, and also the number of alliances 
and acquisitions effected between European multinationals and US-based start-ups.   
 
4.   Implications for Trade Equilibrium and Policy 
  In this paper, the issue of multinationals and the international allocation of assets and 
rents arising from biotechnology R&D were considered. Using the real options model of 
biotechnology R&D developed by Lavoie and Sheldon, modified to include a simple process by 
which multinationals acquired ongoing R&D conducted by start-ups, computer simulation 
illustrates that the presence of international differences in the form of the level of regulatory 
uncertainty, while contributing toward the US comparative advantage in biotechnology 
established by US start-ups, also serves to increase the attractiveness of US R&D as targets for 
multinational acquisition. Thus, the assets and excess returns one would expect to accrue to US 
firms based on their comparative advantage are at least partially re-allocated overseas. 
  The presence of European multinationals in the US biotechnology industry raises an 
interesting policy issue for US trade authorities. The implication of the above analysis is that as 
the regulatory environment in the European Union toughens, the alliance and acquisition activity 
of European multinationals in the US biotechnology industry should increase. But this implies 
that even as the European Union restricts biotechnology activity within its own sphere of 
influence, by imposing such measures as the moratorium on further approvals of biotechnology 
products (Nelson, et  al., 1999), they still enjoy the fruits of biotechnology in the form of  21
European multinationals’ claims on the excess returns from innovation embodied in the 
proprietary knowledge stocks originating from American start-ups. This suggests the following 
question: should the US impose policies to protect ownership of its biotechnology assets in 
response to Europe’s tightening of its regulatory restrictions, and if so, what form should these 
policies take? 
  Another issue is the long-term trade equilibrium that will emerge in biotechnology, given 
the industry's structure and dynamics. It might be expected that, given the favorable R&D 
investment conditions in the United States, which initially established comparative advantage, 
firms located in the United States will continue to specialize in biotechnology R&D and 
production. These firms will be either independent start-ups, start-ups in R&D alliances with 
multinationals, or start-ups that are wholly or partially-owned by multinationals. This pattern of 
specialization suggests that in the long run, the US will be a net exporter of biotechnology 
products. However, the rents commonly associated with high technology production will not be 
entirely captured by US enterprises: rather, a portion of these rents will be appropriated by 
foreign-based multinationals, in the form of intra-firm transfers from US subsidiaries or profits 
shared with US partners. 
It is interesting to note that in the food and agricultural sector, two trading patterns could 
arise.  In the first, the US exports "intermediate" biotechnology products in the form of 
genetically modified seeds, that embody the proprietary R&D, and subsequently imports the 
"finished" product in the form of processed food containing genetically modified ingredients 
derived from the seeds. In this case, the rents from innovation accruing to US entrepreneurs are 
dissipated on two levels: first, through the capture of rents brought about by the European 
multinationals' penetration of the US biotechnology industry, and secondly, through capture of  22
the rents generated in the final consumer market in the form of the premiums commanded by 
differentiated goods, specifically, genetically engineered "designer" foods. 
In the second case, the US exports either agricultural commodities or/and finished food 
products that embody the proprietary R&D.  In this case, the rents from innovation accruing to 
US entrepreneurs are also dissipated on two levels: first, through the capture of rents brought 
about by the European multinationals’ penetration of the US biotechnology industry, and, second, 
through the extent to which European multinational firms have also acquired the ability to 
deliver biotechnology via either acquisition or alliance with US seed and food processing firms.    
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